Nietzsche and Hermeneutics
I aln not about to tell the story of Nietzsche's incorporation, or the resis tance to the same, into the texts and textures of henneneutic discourse.
Firstly this is because slJch readings have already and in fact been offered, in various 'ways, by a l1ulnber of authors, and that for a very long tinle, in articles and even books in English and C;'enllan, in French and Italian, and so on.l Enacting a banal and utterly unerotic repetition of S0l11e version of the prinlal scene-the topic of Nietzsche and Zarathus ira being a particularly "prln1al" exanlplc-it is f~lr froll1 unCOHllnon that authors declare, again and again (this is vvhat Illakes it a prirnal scene), that prior to their own uncanny insight, absolutely no one else had ever 'written on (or seen or noticed that) a particular problf~In or other de served scholarly discussion until they thernsclves tendered their \vords to a \vaiting world.
So writes the student. This is all so Inuch Anp;/iinl!,'(Tei, as Nietzsche calls it, alongside NUe Kinderei; good old childishness and "tyroniS111," as Reg Hollingdale renders the (~ern1an.
P 0 K E Z A RAT H U S T R"A ..
This is also the movie trailer version of philosophy and scholarship in general, if it is also the breathless legacy of modern science: ne\v, origi nal, unheard of, cutting-edge, the latest thing. It ought to go without say ing, but my point is that it does not, that this is a piece of auto-absorbed nonsense, the kind of nonsense that dependency on the Internet has only increased.
And this can seem reasonable enough, but it is nonetheless wrong in the case of Nietzsche and hermeneutics. That is to say: it is inaccurate with respect to Hans-Georg Gadan1er and it is absurd if we are speaking of Gianni Vattimo, just because each one writes on Nietzsche, more pat ently so in Vattilllo's case but not less decidedly so in Gadamer's case. I am able to say this last on direct evidence because C;adamer was my teacher. If I have drunk wine with Vattimo (a very Gadamerian and So cratic and even a very Nietzschean thing to have done), I do not claim to know him ·well. I do know that Gadamer \vas proud to have been as sociated with Leipzig because of Nietzsche and proud to have defended Nietzsche's legacy there, a legacy the Russians at the tilne were eager to ablate.
3 Thus Gadamer includes in his o\vn ecce homo, his "Selbstdarstel lung," an explicit reference to Nietzsche. 1 Nietzsche engages the art of interpretation and regards philology as such an art, and it matters that Gadanlcr himself was a philologist like Nietzsche. If Gadamer writes lllore about Plato and Aristotle, and indeed about Kicrkegaard and Hegel, than did Nietzsche, this tells us only that C;adailler had other tastes than Nietzsche did. Beyond Cadamer we can find Nietzsche's legacy in othcr herrncneutic voices, voices often named "postnl0dern" like Vattilllo, but also like Jean-Fran<;ois Lyotard and UIll berto Eco (\vhere it should also be noted that the designation "postmod ern" often covers incomprehension and is in nearly every case a word for a failure of reading). And even here wc recall that Nietzsche bears upon the postmodern not only because there have been book collections dedi cated to tracing the constellation':) but because he writes against meta narratives, against the "subject," and above all for the -v"ery nletonyrnically postlllodern reason that Nietzsche \vould narne a lack of philology 'which he found to characterize every branch of scholarship, fronl philolof,'Y to physics.
ti Apart fron1 the problenls of philology and rneta-philology, thc probleIll with Nictzsche (and no less the problenl \vith Heidegger and rather less, but still for SOlllC, the problen1 with C~adan1er) is National So cialislll, thus \ve cite Nietzsche gingerly. Nevertheless, if still internal to this problelnatic dirncnsion, in a constellation attending to Nietzsche's stylc,' it is essen tial to begin with fIans-C;eorg Gadarncr's rcruinisccnces upon the trend-setting illlportance of Nietzsche. in the intellectual life of his day, as Gadamer in perfectly apposite and perfectly Heideggerian terms calls Nietzsche "das Europaische Ereignis." 8 It is style for Gadamer, and not only for Derrida, that distinguishes Nietzsche an10ng other great German authors, including Goethe. For Gadamer, Nietzsche's style promises the "dissipation of all ponderous ness" (Fehlens alZer Schwere) , in other words, it promises to abolish, or to put in abeyance the very difficulty usually associated with Germanic style. 9 This distinctively uncharacteristic, almost un-German lightness sets Nietzsche among the greatest stylists of the German language.
For Gadamer, as his self-descriptive, self-accounting tells us, to the influence of both neo-Kantianism and the pathbreaking impact of Hei degger's thought, to the influence of Edmund Husserl, must be added the context of a life-and body-philosophy that ,vas inherently Nietz schean. It is salutary to recall here that even Henri Bergson's impetus would be adumbrated in terms of this wave-and as Bergson himself was disn1issed ahnost ,vithout renlainder for Anglo-Saxon (analytic) philoso phers via Bertrand Russell's cutting derision (no argument and no refer ence to biographical "fact" was involved here), so too went Nietzsche. Mockery to this day rernains the leading analytic t~ope of refusal. 10 Its then-effect was to cut or dismiss Bergson (and Bergson's style) as ,veIl as Nietzsche, and later I-Ieidegger (together vvith their respectively different styles of expression and thought) from the received curriculum of professional, and that Ineans analytic, philosophy.ll By contrast with the fate of Nietzsche within analytic philosophy (which has in the interim been seeking to absorb or co-opt as much Nietzsche as it can stand), the C;ennan fate of Nietzsche, like the French reception of Nietzsche, cannot be explained ,vithout considering other aspects proper to their own respective world-historical political circum stances. 12 Hence, at least in C;'ennany, it would not be Heidegger or Baeurnler and it would not be Jaspers or Lowith as much C;'eorg Lukacs's interpretation of Nietzsche, specifically of his irrationalisnl (echoed in part in Lc)with's reading of Nietzsche's nihilisn1), that articulated the lines of Nietzsche's postwar reception. Indeed: Lukacs's interpretation influenced I-Iaberrnas in particular (if it managed to spare Adorno and Horkhein1er) . J3 If such references are essential in the case of the (;'erman and thence to the French and Anglophone reception of Nietzsche's thought, citations [ron1 Nietzsche lnay not be the only sign o[ the henneneutic relevance of Nietzsche's thought for henneneutics. J~Iow then shall we approach this question?
The hennencutic philosopher Paul Ricoeur tnatches Nietzsche with the lnasters of the kind of sHspicion, alongside Freud and J\tlarx, rul " T H U 5 5 P 0 K E Z A RAT H U 5.T R A " ing our contelTIpOrary scholarly sensibilities.
14 But here and already, the word »suspicion« ~ term Ricoeur borrows from Nietzsche, turns 'out to be explicitly didactic, intended to indicate the kind of suspicions that ought to, if they do not always, frame our thinking. I5 As no one less than Michel Foucault takes up Ricoeur's signal triumvirate, I have elsewhere argued that it is essential to Ricoeur's comparison, as it is comparably essential to reflect with reference to others who similarly invoke Nietzsche, that Ricoeur is not original. 16 Horrors. So, far from coining an expression by articulating this wonderfully French ,image of a hermeneutic ofsuspicion, in fact we find (this is the trajectory of influence, as it is also Gadamer' In what follows I take up this question obliquely because I address it directly elsewhere, by talking about the politics of interpretation, hernle neutics, genealot-,ry, by offering yet another requiem for the postmodern, of the sirnulacrurTI of comnlunication that is the Internet.
Settling Debts: Death and the Hermeneutics of Genealogy
Drinking the henllock to 'which he would very literally o\ve his death, Socrates affirnled a debt of a rooster and with his last words, so Plato tells us, asked his friend Crito to nlake paynlent on his behalf as an offering to i\sclepius, the folk god of healing.
In Nietzsche's version, Socrates declares: "To live-that Ineans to be a long tilne sick: lowe a cock to the saviour Asclepills."lR Scholars like emphasizing that the paradox of these final words is found in the nature of Socrates' healing: hemlock as nostrum. For Nietzsche, this Anaximan drian vision.bf death reflects the rectification of the violation of cosmic oneness or unity that is the injury wreaked by unique or individual life. Naming Anaximander the thinker of the "most profound ethical prob lem," Nietzsche is able to place these words into Anaximander's mouth:
What is your existence worth? And if it is worth nothing why are you there? By your guilt, I observe, you sojourn in this world. You will have to expiate it by death. Look how your earth fades; the seas decrease and dry up, the marine-shell on the mountain shows you how much already they have dried up; fire destroys your world even now, finally it will end in smoke and ashes. But again and again such a world of transitoriness will ever build itself up; who shall redeem you from the curse of Be corning? 19 Like Socrates' obligation to Asclepius, I began by noting Gadamer's and Vattirno's and even Ricoeur's "indebtedness" to Nietzsche. Hence, and reference to other authors can make this still plainer, the very idea of a "debt" to Nietzsche affirnls an essential and suspiciously dangerous and even fatal influence.
By the claims of influence-this is especially characteristic of the rnodern litigationist and no less proprietary age-one claims priority and means to insist upon intellectual tribute, a kind of copyright on an idea or even genius. Hence one is compelled to argue against influence in order to affirm novelty. Such ascriptions of innovation (or denials of the sanle) are duly registered to and debited froln a kind of scholarly patent office. Hence we do better to ask if there was such a debt between contelnporary representatives of the hermeneutic tradition and Nietz sche to begin ,tVith.
We could say not, and we ,tVill say this, especially if w'e favor the con terllporary herrneneutic thinker in question, and if we do not, we lnight he sinlilarly 1110ved to deny such affinity in the reverse direction, albeit for correspondingly differen t reasons, if we like Nietzsche. Everyone roots for the h0111e teanl and every team player resists the imputation of influence. Every thinker his ovvnJesus.
1laving begun by referring very generally to C;adanler and Ricoeur and Vattinlo, it rnay be helpful to explore this questioIl l)y invoking a Illore oblique case in nlore detail, taking up the question of Nietzsche's influcnce on Lyotard. If Lyotard docs not read his Nictzsche as one reads Nietzsche arnong Nietzscheans, alluding to or citing certain texts and ex plaining thell1 to readers vvho have already read (and often cited and even explained) the same texts, Lyotard. explicitly affirms or acknowl edges Nietzsche's influence. So far so good, but is this enough to speak of an intellectual "in debtedness"?
Perhaps we might have to go further and actually read Lyotard.
If so, we are in trouble if we are Nietzscheans (and even if we are not), for Nietzsche tells us that reading does not come to us automati cally: we need first to learn to read, so he tells us, and then we need to read in fact or actually, something we do only reluctantly and then only with authors who matter, or where the investment can pay us back (for the sake of, or as Nietzsche said, in order to write a book or essay of one's own. But in such cases, so Nietzsche points olit, one is not reading).
The common problem of academic and scholarly diffidence is not different in the case of influence, for in order to trace influence we need to read and not merely hunt for names (hardly much of a hunt in any case, given electronic search engines: we click and we know). Beyond such reflections on reading, other scholars have asked after the cogency of speaking of the very presumption of the "French" Nietzsche filtered by way of Heidegger (more on this below), and Lyotard would fall within this same category, Heideggerian as he was supposed to have been. The point is the delimitation of the relevance of Heidegger in this same con junction, including Jean-Paul Sartre but also Jacques Derrida, and in evitably Gilles Deleuze, Georges Bataille, Pierre Klossowksi, and perhaps above all, Michel Foucault, and so on. 21 Thus we ask: was Lyotard (or Gadamer or Vattimo or Foucault or indeed I-Ieidegger) indebted to Nietzsche after all?
Would he have been "indebted" in the way that Bataille may be said to have been indebted to Kojeve, say?
Here we can recall Richard Beardsvvorth's respectfully dutiful ef forts to keep Lyotard focused on Nietzsche in his 1994 interview with hiTn on the subject. Intervie,,,,s are ahvays disappointing, for they prolnise the chance to read/hear what an author "really" thinks on this or that and instead, if one is speaking with a thinker ·with his ,,,,its abo~t hilu (and Lyotard and Heidegger offer fairly good exaluples of this), one hears only confessional relnarks, such as "Ill)' relations ,vith Nietzsche have ahvays been a series of beginnings. Of course, I re-appropriate him massively."22 This very Heideggerian reflection deserves our attention, and one supposes that Beards·worth rnight have done \vell to have taken Lyotard at his vvord, for if he had he might have pressed hil11 about such beginnings', particularly relevant with a thinker such as Nietzsche.
To rephrase the question: is there ever an absence of debt in the sense of influence? Note well that we arc not speaking in exactly eco nomic terms: that is, we are not, indeed, speaking of intellectual capital, as if an idea were something one could live on. This does not mean, of course, that intellectual "stars," like Derrida-but also like the late Rich ard Rorty and the unfailingly thoughtful Alasdair MacIntyre or, popularly now', Stephen Hawking-have not done very well for themselves. But beyond the marketplace of saleable ideas and lectureships (that is also to say, the beginning of nihilism), N~etzsche spoke of living with one's thoughts as one lives with companions of solid flesh and pulsing blood. Nietzsche was far more exigent than Pierre Bourdieu, the philosopher turned sociologist (perhaps by dint of an all-too-academically routine opportunism, which is again the venal matter of getting a job to begin with, so that Bourdieu got the chance to become Bourdieu in the first and last place), because Nietzsche remained classical enough in his sen sibilities to believe that anyone who seeks to earn a living from his ideas was not to be distinguished from the slave or anyone else who works in exchange for lIioney (this ought not to be taken to mean that Nietzsche did not have his own very ordinary and ordinarily monetary ambitions). But doing things "for the money" always has an effect on the result.
Are we not in deeper ways rnore' indebted to those we refuse or ignore? I am speaking of those we fail to cite, fail to read, fail to see.
Or lnaybe the language of debt and the above and inevitably rneto nymic talk of venality should be limi ted to the matters of eCOn0111y? What are the obligations in the exchange-world of scholarship? If everyone I leave out of my reading sphere circumscribes that same sphere, are they not therefore included by reason of the same specific, that is, exactly non-arbitrary exclusion (and this will have nothing to do with intention, for there is an unconscious in the scholarly world as there is in the body and in the life of the lIlind)? In this sense, do I not also discount every nanle accoun ted for by frequency of reference-or, and this is the en gine of the ne\v industry of source scholarship, by 111ention alone? Can I refer to an anthor if I do not do so by name?
Of Nietzsche, Lyotard says, "of course," in a casual concession: "1 re-appropriate him Inassive'Iy."2:1 Indirect allusion is the purest acaclernic kind, and this is especially true for the French-as Anglophone students of Foucault, Deleuze, Lyotard, even Bourdieu, not to Inention Derrida or R.icoeur or Baudrillard, have learned (or need still to learn).
To this degree, any effort to lirnn Nietzsche's influence on Lyotard (or anyone else) \vill have less to do 'with Lyotard's engagenlent \\lith Nietzsche 24 It is significant that the authors in the utterly Nietzschean,just con sidering the title alone, lVhy We Are Not Nietzscheans do not so much oppose Nietzsche as they reflect upon the loss of a certain way of philosophizing in his name. Thus, as Robert Legros writes: "How could a philosopher not be Nietzschean, when all of Nietzsche's philosophy sets out to radi calize the two quests. that are at the very birth of philosophy: to criticize the obvious tenets that carpet the world and, through creation, to evoke wonder at the irreducible enigma the world conceals? How,"25 Legros repeats for emphasis, "to pretend to be a philosopher without feeling oneself to be Nietzschean?"26 A similar sentiment resounds in Philippe. Raynaud's insightful reflection on Nietzsche's critical Enlightenment perspective on the Enlightenment itself, as a post-Kantian prqject that was begun but ought not end with Nietzsche. 27 I would argue that even less than this reflection was involved in Frederic Jalneson's invocation of Nietzsche's name as a specifically un specific, I Inean to say, universal solvent in his preface to the English translation of Lyotard's Postmodern Condition. 28 Thereby, exactly thereby, Lyotard's debt to Nietzsche could be consolidated by collective associa tion, rather than engagement, and whateverJameson meant by invoking Nietzsche in this context need have little to do with Nietzsche himself. fIey, a pretext is a pretext.
Nietzsche's name is that of a conventional signifier of the first order, and to this saIne extent "Nietzsche" is a figment of the Zeitgeist with little connection to the thinker hiInself, just as Heidegger repeatedly empha sizes in his Nietzsche lectures-an emphasis lost on Nietzsche scholars who have gone to Heidegger's Nietzsche looking for yet another explica tion de texte in Heidegger, but \vho typically stop before finding them selves knee-deep in far more of the same than they \vould ever have an ticipated, a point Derrida has al\vays and rightly emphasized.
"Vithout reading too deeply, Lyotard's debt to Nietzsche can be imagined to be little Inore than another word for wild-Inan-style phi losophy, the first step in a chai.n of other linkages. Given other pretexts, Nietzsche can be read and has been read as a better man's Freud or an all-purpose signifier for the ultimate truth of Nazism. This is what the late Richard Rorty calls Nietzschean Schadenfreude--that notoriously un translatable C;ern1an \Nord for a reprehensibly malicious joy or satisfac tion in the suffering or n1isfortune of others.
29 Or Nietzsche's n~llne can be invoked in place of Wagner's (be it to celebrate or else to cOnden111 cultural Wagnerisll1s), or else (and again to COll1e back to our theIne)
as an all-too-brief stop on the one-way track of nihilism that can take the reader, and Lyotard, all the way back to Heidegger. And there is no debate concerning Lyotard's debt to Heidegger or indeed-pace Alan Schrift-the keen relevance of Heidegger's thinking to both twen tieth century and contemporary French thought. (The influence continues indeed in Badiou.) Such associations serve no one particularly well-but if one begins to talk about Nietzsche and Lyotard (or Nietzsche and any one else) ' . be it in the terms of philosophic thinking or in the terms of political ideology, one can only begin on such a comparative basis, even if one usually does so in more or less bad faith.
30
FredericJameson identifies Nietzsche's legacy in Lyotard's thought as the persistent presence of the postmodern as signifier, as the still enduring condition of oilr tilnes. We have already noted one conse quence ofJameson's invocation, as it was this that baptized Nietzsche and so-called Nietzscheans as postmodern, but that would be still another story of another term of abuse or misuse.~il Indeed, Inuch of Lyotard's later writing on "the postmodern" as fable, or as an introductory account of the same, or as told to children, reads as a kind of belnused frustra tion with a term gone wild-one he did not invent, a term that canni balized, if it also drove, his academic reputation and literary/aesthetic fame. Beyond the fashionable decadence of the terIn "posunodern," still and at times a term of assault (to identifY scholars one does not like), we are still absorbed by Lyotard's utterly Nietzschean challenge to the solidity of words and transparency of language as iInmaculate expression and transmission in Nietzsche's Thus Spoke Zarathustra ("On Irnmaculate Perception"-but see also his reflections on sensation and conception in T'he C;ay Science and his later writings) .3~
The saIne all-too-Nietzschean legacy echoes in the subversive cri tique of Lyotard's jJetit recits: the paradigrnatic postlnodern 1110Ve point ing to opposition to the lnaster narrative built into the celebrated cultiva tion of the small facts that are the very stuff of positive science, precisely where science rernains the l110st 111asterly narrative of all, both in Nietz sche's day and in our own. This is why the Nietzsche of 'Ille Birth (~r Trag edy could speak of Togic recoiling upon itself and biting its own tail (and one should, when one thinks of this, always think of the f~lscination of self-fellation, as we Inay be sure that Nietzsche did, if only because that is what the Gern1iUl Ineans). In all respects, the [orn1 of Lyotard's debt to Nietzsche relnains literally fragnlentary. i\nd it is Lyotard \vho has given us an account of the historical and all-too-n10dern reasons for this frag Inenta tion.
In Inodern tenns, and we O\v(' this, so Nietzsche would argue, in any event to Laurence Sterne's 7hs/unn ShJJ.ndy, which is to say in specitl cally biographical terms, the debt to Nietzsche may also be retraced in Lyotard's ovvn formation as the debt to Bataille, and of course via Ba taille's teacher Kojeve. (This is easy to say-it is something else again to imagine that vve thereby know what this particular debt, shared by so many, might mean,_ For it is effectively the tale of an approach to phi losophy apart from the old regime, a literal kind of thinking without a banister, as Hannah Arendt had it.)33
Legitimacy and Narrative Accounting
Infinite misunderstanding.\t\That I love-what Inakes me cry out like a lark with joy to the sun-this forces me to speak it out in melancholy words.
-Georges Bataille, On lVietzsche
If we know the postnlodern as much from its accounts in Un1berto Eco and in Gianni Vattilno, not to lnention the more prosaic architectural accounts (Jencks and jamesol), etc.), we also know it in alnl0st its every detail, before and after the letter of Lyotard's report, inaslTIuch as the point of the account as it is given in Lyotard's The Postrnodern Condition is to tell us the story we already knO'w. That is to say: narrative kinds of knowing ground the rightness, the leg,itirnacy of scientific knowing. Such political cogency constitutes, for example, the difference between the racial science of the Nazis (distinguishing superior races from infe rior peoples) and the contenlporary, post-genolTIe enthusiasln not only for identifying the genetic basis of disease and physical characteristics (distinguishing inferior vulnerabilities to be permanently, "finally" ex punged from the hlunan codex [note the association of science 'with revelation]) but also for the sake of tracking genes f~)r traits to be culti vated and ilnproved, whereby everyone's child can be, in the future of genetic Inanipulation, transfornled into a perfect exemplar of the n1as ter race of technologically perfected hUlnanity. I note that failing that last proll1ise, insurance cOlupanies wilI benefit in any case vvith stilllnore ways to deny rnedical coverage in a country like the lJnited States, where speculating on health and illness is the cornerstone of a thriving indus try. The political schelne of c0111pulsory or universal health insurance adds stillinore resources to the advall tage of the SaI11e industry. This Sa111C' persuasive p()\ver speaks in the theories of Inight that justifY \'var,~~~t the saine theories that are c\'idcnt in the popular Inedia's accounts of the "evolutionarily dClennincd, hardvvired [and pcrf()rce incorrigible] basis for [or justification of] men's 'philandering' and women's 'coyness,' [or for] our capacity to detect cheaters, or to favor our genetic kin, or to be aggressive," to use a description from a recent collection of essays written on the impotent side of the current narrative law of science. 35 
'
At the postmodern acme of incredulity we nonetheless have "faith" in the genetic ideal and in our reductive identity in terms of DNA (we count on the unalloyed successes of genetic engineering as we debate the question of the reduplication of souls in a human clone or else in brain uploading as we argue the merits of the same cybernetic project to use the term Heidegger borrowed from Norbert Wiener's terms-and we presume the successes of stem-cell research as we consider the ethi , cal implications or even the identity of a human-animal mosaic). Thus we also believe in the saIne iconic myth of the Darwin who, like Gali leo, survives all denlystification as an eternally resilien t hero of "progres sive" thought-following the model of the good old, or exactly modern "narrative of emancipation. "36 Thus the difference between Nazi race science and the ideal of human genetic engineering is not substance (by any means) but exactly a rnatter of le{l.,ritimacy, in precisely the way Lyotard argues. For Nietzsche, this is the reflective condition of knowledge, that is, it is the basis of Nietzsche's critical reflection on the very possibility of knowledge and truth.~)7 This critical dependency may be equated, for Lyotard, with our own all-too-curren t rnodernity.
The critically subversive turn countering this dependency forms the point of departure for Lyotard's discussion of the postmodern con dition. To distinguish itself froln and against the ancient and lnedieval scientific resort to Illetaphysics, that is, in order to be modern, science refuses the rnetaphysical scherne of argument without, however, repudi ating its righ t to the ancien t ideal of truth that characterized the first lov ers ofwisdoI11 (truth for its own sake, and, as Nietzsche would ernphasize, at an.y price). Thus, for Lyotard, science abandons the rnetaphysi(:a] search for a first proof or transcendental authority as a response to the question "\1\;110 decides the conditions of truth?" It is recognized that the ... rules of the game of science are innnanent in that gaIl1e, that they can only be established \vithin the bonds of a de bate that is already scientific in nature, and that there is no other proof that the rules are good than the consensus extended to thenl by the experts.
This <lrglnnent itself is the n1erely logical lirnit of a closed systern, nTHUS SPOKE ZARATHUSTRA" or less sniveling faith in the "really real" of realism-that is, cheap, antic empIrICIsm.
For Richard Rorty, in a casually articulated counter-word: such an argument corresponds to Mary Hesse's commonsensical critique of scientific knowing. At its sophisticated cutting edge-it would not have been lost on Rorty that the philosophy of science has, other, more du rable and more powerful edges-Hesse claims that "it has been suffi ciently demonstrated [by 'what she, perfectly postmodern in the sense suggested above, calls the "post-empiricist" Anglo-Alnerican philosophy of science] that the challenge of theoretical science is irreducibly meta phorical and unformalizable, and that the logic of science is circular interpretation, re-interpretation, and self-correction of data in terms of theory, theory in terms of data.":) 9 Rorty argues that Lyotard "happily" ap propriates this "kind of debunking of enlpiricist philosophy of science ... Ur:tfortunately, he does not think of it as a repudiation of a bad account of s,cience but as indicating a recent change in the nature of science."4o
Rorty notes that Lyotard overestimates the liberating potential of science in the wake of the larger project of the philosophy of science which, while conceding the integrity and viability of such "demonstra tion" (and its reference to history, culture, or empiricisIn), busily contin ues, without the need for any such historico-cultural references, churn ing out formal analyses of theory, structure, syntax, and semantics. 41
For Rorty, Lyotard goes too far both because he lacks the rigor of analytic restraint and because, and this is understandable enough for a one-time Marxist, Lyotard iocates the material salvation of history in his enthusiasn1 for the empo\vering potential of computers. eyber-aesthetic enthusiasts frOITI Ray Kurzweil to Manuel deLanda, but also Donna Har away and Don Ihde and indeed ,C;ianni Vatti rn 0 , all, and despite their nlany differences, could not agree more with Lyotard on this issue, and only a reactionary acadernic \voltld dare to say otherwise. Thus "techno bashing" or "anti-science" sentiment is excluded in advance.
Technology liberates, and virtual technology liberates cOll1pletely freed as one is of the body, in jJotentia, and this is not to be drearned in a future of robotic alter egos or rnechanical avatars; one has this potential already realized in the irreality of the Baudrillardian hypcrreal, a life as it can exactly vicariously be lived here and novv through cell phones, text messages, tweets, and status posts on Facebook, not to lllention YouTube and other Internet video sites. Thus Vattirl10 writes in 2005: I lUll thinking of the "ludic" (playful) llses of SO[l1e very sophisticated virtual-reality technologv: e.g., the creation ofjoyful , even erotic, experi ences, through the sanle means the Inilitary llses to train space pilots.
"reality" itself, because it makes less and less sense to object that virtual reality is 'Just" virtual. 42 At the same time, critique itself is transfornled and found to be nothing other than that very anti-scientific danger now deplored and declared out of bounds. 43 Thus we have a positive answer in his "Some thing like: 'Communication ... without Communication,'" where Lyo tard muses, "We are losing the earth ... , which is to say the here and now, but are we gaining something and how are we gaining it? Can the uprooting which is linked to the new technology promise us an emanci pation?"44 Lyotard's question is prophetic and explicitly so, thus he nei ther endorses nor does he criticize. It is not clear that Lyotard really means to affirm this possibility, in a different voice, echoing Montaigne, ' he had already emphasized the complex registers of the mind's depen dence on the body in his earlier lecture-chapter "Can Thought Go On Without a Body?" speaking in Nietzsche's voice here, against the phi losophers (which ones? the ot~ers, of course, not Lyotard himself, and where does Nietzsche stand, who had for his part offered similar reflec tions in his Philosophers'Book and The Gay Science, but above all the Nietz sche of Beyond Good and Evil?): "If this body is not properly functioning, the ever so complex operations, the meta-regulations to the third or the fourth power, the controlled deregulation of which you philosophers are so fond, are impossible."45
The language is as much Nietzsche's as it is Montaigne's (ceteris pari lnis) , but Lyotard goes on to list the necessary points of contact for a script for a disembodied mind, very like those interested in designing Internet games or interactive sketches for online gaIning cOlnnlunities (the spaces of the virtual or non-real real that is the locus of nihilism so popular today) .46 All that remains is to take his pointers. Whether Lyo tard Ineant his comments archly or earnestly is hard to say, given the text that is all that is left of the lecture. There is more than one way to hear the conclusion of his preface in praise of the econonlY, in praise of development, reflecting that the "debt to childhood is one we never payoff. "17 C;ames are like that.
Like Michel Serres' celebrationist history of science, Lyotard's pro technology perspective nlay yet prove to be the most successful acadelnic take on technology, handily so given, as we have just noted, the virtual social life of today's youth (and SaIne not so youthful), and thus in spite of Rorty's htctically easy criticisrns. 10 elnphasize the obliq LIe heart of lIeidegger's identification of technolot,ry as "nothing technological" is also to reflect on the ,yay that the hlunan itself is nevel', solely on the basis ofhulnan resources, the SUIn total of all thatnlakes the hlllnan vv'hat it is.
The excess beyond that summation i~ the destiny of modern technology as a modality of revealing or aletheic truth. It is for Heidegger the way Being in the modern era is made manifest (or shows itself).
The postmodern problem, for Lyotard, is that scientific language games or, better still (to use the Lyotardian convention of the Differend) , scientific "phrasing" games are formal, systems, particularly as parsed in the terms of analytic philosophy of science. And the trouble with formal systems-a trouble with logically impeccable credentials via mathematics (Codel) and indeed the philosophy of science (Duhem-Quine )-is that, as Lyotard emphasizes, the problem of completeness aI-ways remains the Achilles' heel of such systems, incorrigible, ineliminable. Such systems are inevitably internally limited, not because the postmodernists say they are, but because they are axiolnatic systems. And since the rules of the language/phrasing game of science are not the rules of completeness (formally impossible in any case), in the late or postnlodern condition of conternporary knowledge, phrased via technology, the technical lnoves of science are no longer reviewed \vith reference to the Kantian ideals of what Lyotard romantically lists as "the true, the just, or the beautiful, etc., butto efficiency: a technical move is good when it does better and/ or expends less energy than another."48 T'he upshot of this efficient defi nition ties into the demand for spending and the complete coincidence to be found between research (and/or) development and management, as between pure theory and practical application. As we heard Lyotard express this coincidence, the "games of scientific language become the games of the rich, in \vhich whoever is wealthiest has the best chance of being right."49 Ah, of course. And critics fronl the Indian subcontinent argue this case as well, without needing any references to Lyotard to do it (though, as with Lyotard himself, Heidegger and Heidegger's critique of Descartes turn out to be very important) .50 In this last instance, the privileged accolade of doing "good science," of being shown to be right, that is, of having access to the legitilnating discourses of "truth," is what counts as or what ultinlately proves proof. For Lyotard, the circularity evi dent in this argtllnentation is no accident. It is the very closed circuit of the circulation of capital. And \ve Alnericlns need no one to tell us that Illoney is always legitimation.
So far Lyotard's debt (and he has others beyond the critique of meta-narratives and the fluidity of discursive signifiers, to the reference to the body and to desire) to Nietzsche (and did I say Hcidcgger?). \Vhere Lyotard parts company with Nietzsche is the proxilnate place that Lyo tard turns out to have accurately anticipated rnodern technolof.,>J (and that advance lllove is the key techno-signifier). For Lyotard, no\<\' aln10st quaintly, although other contenlporary thinkers will indeed concur, the ideal learning community is to be found in cyberspace, needing no Con nection to history or to the earth, no connection to any particular place. Above all, such a locus presupposes an end to the charmingly antique notion (the title, the prestige, but especially the real-life vocation or just the job) of the university professor.
Instead of free love, instead of free medical care, a living wage, and so on, the illusory promised land that the (post-Marxist) Lyotard offers as liberation (your educators, Nietzsche tells us, are always your libera tors) turns out to be free schooling without access to a school or the de gree or the.networked old-boy connections of the same, all guided by the machine, the ultimate phraser that is the browser, the program, or the game, the vagaries of the Internet-and a Boolean search. All to be guar anteed by free Web access, very like the kind inherently on order on to day's Internet, today's browser-cum-search engine, cum-desktop toolbar, advertising pop-up and so on. This anti-Humboldtian, anti-professorial ideal of (and for) the university, the proximate future of our educa tional institutions in a sense Nietzsche never dreamt, is, of course, the sweetest current administrative hope at every American university. It is the dream of a university unencurnbered by faculty: pure tuition; in e-profits, online learning, in the virtual, projectedly illusionary, imagi nary world that is the interactive cybernetic ideal. Dot-com dreaming for the post-labor, that is to say the post-productive, economy. And add the lnelting of the ice caps on the poles to the dream. We Inay yet have the long-dreamed passage across the poles from one side of the Western Hemisphere to the East and vice versa, but the poles of north and south, and this, as an ancient table of opposites once told us, is a Illatter of cold and warmth. We lose the distinction in our unrelenting destruction of the environment. We know this, scholars say this, and we (all of us and not just other peoj)le) do nothing. We change nothing about our lives and our way of life. Transportation, Inanufacture, deforestation, destruction, all business as usual, every bit of it continues apace and spreads across the globe.
No one, certainly not governnlcnt organizations, nor indeed non governnlental organizations, and certainly not corporate in terests, is stopping the destruction of forests, the growth of the desert in an utterly non-Nietzschean sense; the brutal slaughter of anilnals in factory farIlls accelerates, the elinlination of habitat guarantees the death of \vild ani Tnals that hunters (for thrill or profit or habit, as we can now llarne tracli tion) do not exterrninate, shoot, club to death, trap, net, and so on.
We, not just you or I1le, we \vill ]lot stop until we have fished the oceans elnpty of all fish, all turtles. And speaking of the dolphins and \vhales that Ollr sonar inexorablv and alrcadv drives to the ec1Q'e of extinc tion if ourJapanese and Norwegian and other fishing boats \vere not also hell-bent on "harvesting" for a market of cans and restaurants used to an immediate and immense supply, stock on hand, they are also fished to replenish the dolphins that die in our entertainment shows or in swim ming with the dolphins programs, and they die at a rate that keeps a mar ket primed. Swimming \vith us, towing us, letting us touch them, doesn't just upset and "insult" dolphins, it apparently kills them.
Nor, this seems all too evident, wil~ we stop until we have stripped the earth and laid waste to the most ordinary of things, land, water, and air, all for profit, as profit loves a ,var and as our politics runs only in ac cord with the dream of capital. Until it too runs, as it has been running, into the ground.
The Tragedy of the Political Commons, the Real, and Nietzsche .So we expect love to be a solution for infinite suffering? And what choice do we have? Within us anguish is infinite, and we fall in love.
-Georges Bataille, On lVietzsrhe
Beyond tracing the suit of a debt's legitirnate claim, the question of honor renlains. For its sake, \ve require Nietzsche's imperative review of science not on the ground, of science and scientific reason but as a version of art. 'This does notl cannot "reduce" science to art, as Rorty and Habermas and other post-Lyotardian critics fear, because Nietzsche never simply seeks to look at science in the light of art, but always also in the light of the cOlllplex play of art-in-life. And art is, if anything, even mOTe of a problerl1 for philosophy than science, even in the context of a postnl0dern report on the state of knowledge in our tinle, which may be why thinkers 1'ro111 Heideggcr to (~adalner but not less [ronl Adorno and Baudrillard to LyoLard and \Tattinlo turn to reflect on art. For i\ietzsche, the practice of lnodern philosophy of science ilni tates the practice of Illodern science itself (without, for that, being iden tical vvith science) as \vhat he nalnes the latest (and best or grandest) fortn of the ascetic ideal. \t\There Nietzsc he proposes to review science not only OIl the ground of li fc (or pcnver or w'hat increases the saIne, as S0111e evolutionarily' lnillded Nietzscheans suppose-happily Inistaking Nietzsche for 110bbcs, via I)an\Tin, Nietzsche's prilne antipode) but also on the ground of art, the jffoblpm with science is not that it does not serve to enhance life (this it surely does, if it does so clumsily and mechanically/ geekily-where today's techno-scientific hero is exactly proud of his ut ter lack of style), but that it does so without artistic sensibility. Nietzsche writes that "the truth is ugly," hence, he explains, we "have art, so that we are not undone by truth."51 The art in question is not art for art's sake or for its honesty (the truth of art is the avowed truth of untruth), but art as a celebration of beauty.
Since, asJean Baudrillard has it, the consumer triumph epitomized by the enduring simulacra of American cold-war advertising ideals and ideologies, what counts in the place of truth and beauty is the practical good. What Lyotard nan1es "the spirit of performativity," assuring the ideal Inatch of means/ end, corresponding to "the best possible input/ output equation," is what can be done. 52 That is, it is not a matter of is ilnplying ought, or the other way around. What is operative is the simple impetus of possibility; what can be done is what is done.
The logic of practice, which is the logic of craft or art, which is technology, rules inthe postmodern condition of exactly scientific knowl edge. It is not the Platonic-Aristotelian or nletaphysical ideal of truth but Inerely funding that is at stake. And the practical applications of tech nol0 6 1' are as circular as the same narrative self-referentiality. Thus, to say that "incredulity toward metanarratives"53 characterizes the postmod ern condition or that "the grand narrative has lost its credibility"54 is to elnphasize that the point of the story told is irrelevant. Accordingly, "the blosso111ing of techniques and technologies since the Second World ''''ar, which has shifted en1phasis from the ends of action to its rneans," betrays the decline of narrative, and technology is not merely a further con tribution to the old Enlightenment narrative of liberation. 55 The quote Lyotard takes from Nietzsche as the explanans for the phenornenon of "European nihilism"-that favorite signirying term of both French struc turaliS111 and post-structuralism-resulted from the truth requirelnent of science being turned upon itself 5G and (as already noted) biting itself in its O\\1n tail.~)7
The cool height of Nietzsche's critical pr(~ject-"I airn to regard the question of the value of kno\vledge like a cold angel who sees through the 'whole shabby business, not with cruelty but 'without vvannlh"5x-is no correlate but is antipodal to Bel~jalnin 's theoretically becalnled figure of history. Nietzsche's cold angel sees through the gray passivity of the gray scholars who believe in truth. 59 But derying representation, like the sublirne in Lyotard's later writing, vvhat Nietzsche calls the truth of art is not a representation of the real. To use an aesthetic exalnple which Lyo tard specifically traces beyond Nietzsche to Kant's third critique (reduc ing Nietzsche's perspectivisnl to nihilisHl in the process), the "theule of We need to read this Real not merely i'n the torsions of Lacan's terrninol ogy but in terrns of Baudri~lard's reality principle, the hyperreal-as-real, his integral reality.M This is not the contingent brutality of an inelim inably factive encounter. Instead \ve fail to see the totalizing residue, ashes 1110re invisible than nonexistent, we deny the dust of two volatilized skyscrapers-concrete and steel and lTIortal remains-denied, \vaste im possible to conceive or to imagine. The ~evastation, the annihilation in question was the work of modernity itself. But Descartes was able to dis solve not only his body but the whole of the earth and all the heavens with it, all kneaded into his o\vn imago/ ego, by thinking alone. Today we project ourselves into glowing screens and locate ourselves and find love and all kinds of lneaning there.
'This p()\ver to really \vill nothing (the virtual: Baudrillard's hyper [or a-] reali ty), the uncanny legacy of our consummately intentional hunlan and (in) hUlnan way of l?eing (expressed in terms of a life with and arnongMayan pyrarnids, Chinese bones, Greek masks, or for us to day, our autolnohiles into the fenders of which we project ourselves at speeds of seven ty 111iles an hour and 111ore , or else and lTIOre lilnitedly, Inore absorbingly, everybody's favorite Internet, be it average or arcane), is the secret to the power of modernity, and Nietzsche called it nihilisnl. Thus he has his Inadnlan in The Gay Science ask: "Ho\v could we drink up the sea? \I\'ho gave us the sponge to wipe a\vay the entire horizon? What were we doing when \ve unchained this earth fronl its sun? Whither arc we Inoving now?"(i:) And in the third section of On the (;enealogy of iV[or als, where Nietzsche details the fundalnen tal kinship bet\veen science and religion as instantiations of the saIne ascetic ideal that drives 1110dcr nity, he ans\vers his own Inadll1an'S ilnpetllous query: "Since Copernicus, man seen1s to have got himself on an inclined plane-now ,he is slipping faster and faster away from the center into-what? Nothingness?"66 The fact that we ourselves have outlined this trajectory does not change the register of the Real to one that can be made less insurgent. For that we will need art, not for art's sake, but for the sake of life.
In Kant's Critique ofJudgment, the unencompassable countenance of the world in all its excess is the reality of nature beyond representa-' tion. For Lyotard, the negative theological insight at the heart of the biblical prohibition of images recalls the analogical recogni tion of the incommensurability of human knowledge with its sublin1e object, that is, as Spinoza first articulated this alternative reflex: "Deus sive natura." Like Nietzsche's consonant dissonance, or joy exactly through and in suffering,67 modern art as Lyotard describes it "pleases only by causing pain."68 If, as Lyotard suggests, "the avant gardes in painting ... devote themselves to making an allusion to the unpresentable by means of vis ible presentations," presenting "the fact that the unpresentable exists,"69 then, contra Lyotard, we need Illore than a list of the narnes at the cut ting edges of the art world, ~s~ an ethos that folds itself out of currency. We need Illore th4n a flight to the cultural privileges of art; more than a thinking 'that binds itself as closely as Lyotard does to the opposition between the beautiful and the sublime.
Beyond modern art and more than postmodern efforts, Nietzsche reminds us that what we need rnost is to learn to see as artists see: this is, would be, could be an artist's artistry, and only an artist's artistry can permit us to speak of art in the light of life.
Nietzsche is speaking of a creative aesthetics, an active aesthetics. As an increasingly endangered capacity in us, as artists who have forgot ten ourselves, Nietzsche urges us to bring forth a dancing star, to spin this out of ourselves as the poets we want to be, as Nietzsche writes, of our lives.
In this sense, Nietzsche rneans the dance literally, and he sees the dancing in the contelllplation of the dancer, as Alain Baniou has rightly read hinl in his lnaesthetics. But Nietzsche also 111eans the dance of life, before the unknown god, before the seducer god, and this is pure llleta phor. This poet's dance can be the throw of the dice or the Inere 'whirl of existence at the sn1allest level of the inadvert~nt and the everyday.
Fronl such a perspective, the beauty of art does not take a position outside or beyond science. Instead it clairns the transfiguring necessity of art internal to science, of art as identical with science, as both rIeidegger and Nietzsche insist 011 this identity. Nietzsche Inquiry 7 [1973] : 254-60), among many others, and among whom I count rnyself. That there will be disputes among these authors as to who has got Nietzsche right (or wrong) should go without saying. That SOllle of these authors will acknowledge Gadalner and some others Ricoeur and still others Vattilno hinlself should also go without saying. At the saIne time, influences, and this is a lesson that the cur rently burgeoning industry of source scholarship (reinventing the tradition on the model of the Internet) has yet to grasp, 111ay not be lilllited to those authors one explicitly engages, lllentions, or footnotes (positively or negatively). Thus the reader is welcolne to take as included, in positive spirit and intention, all those nlany naines not mentioned here. 
Friedrich
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. Theories ofjust war are on the rise given the current U.S. occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan, and Noam Chomsky duly insists on the language of "U.S. aggression," thinking, as he must think, somehow, that we the American people lJ)ill mind if the occupation (Chomsky rightly notes, albeit only with refer ence to Indochina in 1967, that without an opponent or another side, there is no "war"; in the absence of an Afghani or Iraqi attack, the justification for invasion, at least in the case of Iraq [the case of Afghanistan remains absurd], was preven tative, ajustification which was subsequently revealed as without basis) is named for what it is, as with Vietnam: "plain, outright, aggression." But why imagine that we the American people will mind the designation of U.S. "aggression," we who so manifestly do not mind body counts of our military drawn from among the country's lllost disenfranchised, or the unspeakable violence toward civilians (the Iraqi dead are not counted, as if without a count they do not count), or arbi trary U.S. torture protocols and unceasing practice? But is there any kind of tor ture that is not arbitrary? What mind-set are we in when we suppose, somehow, that torture serves an end? What end? Where shall that end be found? We are, as of the current rnornent of writing, seemingly no longer sure how to "define" the word or the practice of torture. See ChOlllsky, What "¥Ve Say Goes . \Vith such a provocative line our editors ll1ean to take a critical look at evolutjon ary psycholol-,'Y' but they thelnselves acknowledge that the conviction regarding such detenninist f~lctors characterizes not only COIlllnonsensc thinking but the highest level of scholarly reflection, frolH the author of Soeiobiolob,) ' and eOllstl ienee down to the Inore sophisticated or gullible acadernic practitioners of tracli t~onal philosophy who write on the "evolutionary" basis of ethics. Nevertheless, the antj-Darwinian side offers a perspective that is inevitably illlpotent because it cannot engage other perspectives, even those sprung from the scientistic vanity of creationist "theory" (here carefully set off in "scare-quotes" to reassure both author and re<lder).
~G.
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